Poland In The Face Of Regional Transformation And Global Challenges
by Józef Oleksy Ph.D.
Poland
I. Poland and the double challenge
We have changed our political system and the order of things within Europe.
The Polish community has supported the changes. The Polish left has understood that the previous system has collapsed never to return and has chosen the Euro-Atlantic course honestly and irrevocably. All political orientations have universally accepted the validity of NATO membership and the efforts made to accede into the European Union.
A discussion is proceeding on the need for mental reorientation to ensure that the Polish people understand what it means to be in NATO and the UE.
Disputes are being waged as to the social effects of the reforms being implemented, on the role of the state particularly in promoting social investments and the pro-development course.
The following challenges should be recognised as the most important:
A. The "catching-up" challenge
Poland is aware of the distance which separates it from the highly developed countries.
We shall not take this civilisation step by ourselves which is why we treat NATO and EU membership as an impulse to make changes which have been tested in the most developed countries. Privatisation must be accelerated and discipline maintained in public finance and reforming the taxation system. In a short 2 - 3 years Poland can register an annual growth rate of some 7 - 8% and will be the most rapidly developing country. Steps must be taken to encourage foreign capital to place direct investments in Poland, particularly in hi-tech areas. Poland's acceleration of reforms must signify curbing inflation which today is already less than 9%, the creation of the abilities of companies to make a profit and create new jobs, overcoming gaps in effectiveness and combating unemployment.
Errors were not avoided at the very first stage of the changes. The taxation system was not reformed on time. Enterprises were rinsed out of money. The reform of the banking system was neglected. Much of the revenue generated by privatisation was consumed by the national budget and was not injected into upgrading these enterprises.
We were unable to tackle the dispute on narrowing the influence of the state and focusing it firmly on strategically important social investments.
The trades unions continue to enjoy an excessive role and be over-politicised.
Poland coped successfully with the Russian and world financial crisis. We must adapt better to the second challenge which is:
B. Accommodation to global challenges
Poland is situated within the zone of all world financial and economic influences. We cannot be indifferent to the state of health of the world economy.
He who wishes to make avail of the global market must ensure his own economy stands on healthy foundations since remedial measures for financial crises in the world may not be expected in the immediate future. We are and shall continue to be for a long time at a stage in which every country will have to adapt to crises and function in a global economy.
Forces of the left in such a situation will be faced with a dilemma between budgetary discipline imperative for secure participation in the global market, and social needs and a development philosophy which will have to be presented to each community.
Certain symptoms can be observed pointing to the weakness of contemporary capitalism Some are already talking of: postcapitalism. The greatest weakness and "guilt" lies in the fact that the free transfer of large capital was to have coped with development disproportion and to have animated development in the farthest corners of the contemporary world. Something quite different happened. The disproportions are not only vanishing but are increasing. Speculative capital as it freely wanders around the world is deepening such disproportions in its search for profit and leading to perturbation in countries which, objectively speaking, should never have been exposed to such a crisis for such a reason. So perhaps the philosophy of market capital freedom in the world is not true as a factor animating development where it would have been possible for other reasons. But that is not happening and there is talk today of big-capital politics blowing up out of all proportion investments made on the shares market while simultaneously causing the outflow of a stream of money from "troublesome" markets. There is an obvious impact of speculative capital on internal crises. Global-wide capital speculation must lead to recession and recession to a reduction in global trade, in the final account to a slump in global demand. Between 1995 and 1997 world trade rose by an annual 2.7 percent but in 1997 it fell by 5.8 percent and in 1998 by 4.1 percent. In a word we are facing an evident fall in the rate of world trade expansion. The same is true of the fall in the demand for raw materials and the drop of raw material prices. Since 1997 the price of crude oil fell by 40 percent, of coffee by 44 percent, of copper by 41 percent etc. It is interesting to note that these radical slumps in raw material prices have not been causing a drop in consumer prices. That is an area for separate analysis. The strength of the American economy is the hope at this moment of world crisis, since it is a problem facing all national economies - the issues of the ability of enterprises to generate profit. The Japanese crisis has resulted in a 2-3 percent drop in the ability of companies to generate profit while companies in the USA possess this ability to the level of 22 percent and in Europe to 15 percent.
So a challenge facing national policy is to form a policy which helps to create the ability of companies to generate profit. What are the remedial means? A world-wide discussion has been proceeding, starting from Davos through other banking and economic bodies, on how to cope with the world crisis. Some say there is no way out, that the natural element is of such force that you will have to wait until it runs its course. Others claim - not without reason in the USA - that the remedial means is a transparent economic policy, void of customs barriers and protectionism, in a word the thesis which is justified in the light of the state of the American economy - the thesis of intensifying liberalism, openness and unimpeded movement in internal economies and the world economy as a whole.
This is opposed by the thesis which is gaining momentum in Europe and Japan today and which speaks of the need to introduce some kind of world mechanisms of controlling capital markets. I do not intend to quote all the arguments here. On the one hand the aim is regulation of the instability of capital movements and on the other - the fear is that attempts to introduce regulation of the flow of especially short- and medium-term capital could lead to a new global disintegration of the economy and to trade wars. What is aimed at here is, specifically, various bans and administrative forms of restricting the flow of capital in cases of market panic and the collapse of the market situation. On the other side, one of the remedial means is seen in the construction of a new infrastructure, a new financial architecture of the contemporary world.
A global challenge must lead to a global solution which is why the incapacity and helplessness of world financial institutions which were established many years ago in a completely different state of the world economy - must be evaluated critically. They are increasingly helpless in opposing crises which are unavoidable and which separate countries cannot cope with. The reform of world financial institutions requires co-operation of countries, the control of high-risk funds and short-term capital control. Many sceptics are of the view that the natural element of world capital and also financial investors will never consent to any form of regulation.
A challenge of a global nature is the tension which may arise in relations between Europe and America, between the dollar and the euro zones.
Europe and the USA should not compete against each other. The United states have no self-centred interests in Europe but only such as also concern the interests of the whole of Europe, its security and peaceful development.
The Euro-Atlantic space as an area of peace, democracy, human rights and stability - such are the common goals of the USA and Europe.
We sometimes speak a bit in irony and fun but also a bit seriously, on the need to struggle for "globalisation with a human face". The question, however, is: does globalisation have any kind of face related to people and human motivations. The prevailing opinions are that globalisation is a natural element, an element independent of the will of its participants to the full extent. With that in mind, the thesis of burdening creditors with a larger section of the outcome of crises will become increasingly popular. But today all the results of a crisis are borne by the debtors. Creditors come to terms with this quite rapidly since it is they who participate in these rapid financial movements. Discussions are increasingly heard on the social functions of global concerns. We are already aware what supranational concerns are and to what degree they are independent. The international society must find some method by which these supranational concerns would have some element of social control and social activity which would be unavoidable when counteracting the element of a world crisis.
Mention could be made here of releasing the most poverty-stricken countries from their debts, or periodical releasing, specifically because globalisation does not satisfy the conditions of levelling out development in various regions of the world. Or to refrain to some extent from the rapid withdrawal of finance from countries which fall into trouble. Or finally to restrict the insensitivity of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank which until recently just did not recognise the social dimension of processes in national economies and the world economy. The first, definitely interesting symptoms have already appeared. It is no secret that the Monetary Fund for the first time consented to render financial means available to Russia to pay outstanding pensions, a wholly new phenomenon on the operations of a world financial institution. Or, for instance, in Japan where the Monetary Fund agreed to pay from its means for social assistance given fired workers. That is one direction in the search for a social dimension of the activity of financial institutions and global concerns.
A decreasing trend can be observed in expenditure for foreign assistance. What is required is the consolidation of a feeling of a community of threat particularly from the viewpoint of the recurrence of world crises. It would be wonderful were some rules to appear for global development. Civilisation must start to define the rules of global development and a common trans-frontier strategy, a common remedy for these ills since for the moment nothing like that exists. And a future concept exists to influence the pattern of consumption. To implement consumption models in countries of varying resistance to world crises.
Individual countries must elaborate their own programmes to minimise the effects of a crisis. It is claimed that the roots of the recent crises are also in the political institutions of various countries, that is in the inability of the elites of those countries to undertake imperative reforms.
Poland faces the dilemma to avoid impairing investor trust especially since the purpose is to change the structure of direct investments to a greater extent than at present. A strong development policy leads to a budget deficit which means Poland faces a challenge to reconcile the issue of the dangers stemming from expansive development with that which is required by such development. Undoubtedly a country has to be prepared for the global market also through reforming institutions and offices. Countries which are unable to put their house in order will lose out. The thing is that capital and valuable persons will remain in the country and serve its development only when they are offered the image of a well-organised country requiring their knowledge and talents, giving pride of place to education and technical progress, when public culture and public services will be at a level satisfying the most valuable individuals, when the law will be of adequate quality, when competition will be less "brutal" and when it will compose together with the functions of a modern state and work performed in a modern manner.
The challenge is appearing to prepare citizens to function in global market conditions. Languages, internet, trouble-free team work, openness of people, curiosity about the world, the ability to adapt smoothly to new conditions. Such are the culture changes which stand ahead. And enterprises, too, must be prepared for global market activity.
One of the many benefits why may emerge from Poland's participation in NATO is a reduction of extra-economy investment risks as sensed by investors. Poland's presence within NATO opens the possibility of Poland's access to development technologies.
II. Poland in NATO - new opportunities and new duties
A. The Road to Membership
Poland's approach to NATO was gradual. In November1992 NATO membership was set as the strategic goal of Polish foreign policy. Such restraint was often the subject of criticism and, with hindsight, this had justified causes. The first was not to antagonise Russia unnecessarily (it was still the USSR then), particularly at the time of complex negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. The reaction of the erstwhile command of the Polish army was also uncertain. The NATO countries were also not ready at that time for talks on expansion. NATO's negative reaction to the 1990 declarations of Hungary and Czechoslovakia on their intention to apply for membership in the Alliance is still fresh in memory. The Alliance modified their political, military doctrine only in 1991 when the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was created, opening the way for new members to be accepted.
But full clarity still was absent in Poland as to the advisability of applying for NATO membership. To many politicians, to shake off vassalage to the USSR was an incredible gift of the gods. Their horizon of political thinking was demarcated by the status of neutrality. "Finlandisation" was as far as their dreams would go. Other politicians were not sure of the West's real intentions and took a sceptic attitude towards NATO, bearing in memory the manner in which Poland was left to fend for itself in 1939. There were also fears concerning Germany. Doubts as to the concept of unification and then the stubborn demand for Poland's voice to be heard in the "two plus four" conference was, admittedly, deeply justified historically but it was also evidence of insufficient readiness to open full alliance-type relations with our western neighbour. In those days Polish diplomacy aimed at creating a European security system, alongside NATO as it were (vide Poland's proposal to establish a Council of European Co-operation in 1990 and, somewhat later, the concept of a NATO-bis). But the speed at which events progressed were more rapid than the changes occurring in the minds of many politicians. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR, as well as the dissolution of Poland's first "contract" Parliament, shoved Poland towards fresh possibilities and prompted to farther-reaching activities.
The tactics of gradual steps, though initially inspired by events and to a large extent based on intuition, proved effective. The sense and nature of the Alliance had first to be comprehended and then widely disseminated to muster the majority of national political forces around the idea of membership (the fact that more than 70% of Poles support our membership of NATO is surely the outcome, to a large extent of displaying restraint in the initial period). It was the right-wing formations which first announced the idea of membership of NATO. But the moderation displayed by the left, including the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), initially was not an expression of aversion to the West in general and to NATO membership in particular but rather an expression of the fear that excessively rapid and unprepared measures for membership might unnecessarily destabilise the situation in Central Europe. However by 1993 the SLD had reoriented its policy and came out unambiguously for NATO membership. Since then the issue has become the subject of national accord which allowed the activities of Polish politicians and diplomats to be given enormous impetus and force in the attempts to gain NATO membership.
The more enlightened Russian politicians fully understand the historical European process. However, they continue to wield the argument of an alleged danger on the part of NATO for purely tactical reasons, or to divert public opinion away from other real problems. But other more serious causes also exist: imperial ambitions and nostalgia for the power of the erstwhile USSR are still alive in Russia, as is a sense of historical injury in the wake of the events in the recent past and the wish to reconstruct that empire. We firmly reject the motives of this protest against expanding NATO since they are a threat to our security and are fundamentally contradictory with European values, including the idea of peaceful co-operation of sovereign states.
I think that Poland could do more for NATO if we were able to establish really good relations with Russia. First at all political areas. Then we would be able to help persuade Moscow that good relations with the US and NATO are in fact, to their advantage and could strengthen their security. This is not beeing done at the moment. We, the Left, do not have, sufficient influence over our governments policy. They, in government, on the other hand, have deep historical prejudice towards Russia. Therefore, a Polish potential possibilities vis-a-vis Russia are not effectively taken advantage of.
The "New York Times" has for long been waging an anti-NATO crusade, expressing the convictions and feelings of a substantial though systematically diminishing section of American public opinion. The remaining major argument is "Russia first", that is the view that to extend NATO to the area of Central Europe does not serve American interests since it might lead to a deterioration of relations with Russia. This is a false view for two reasons. First, peace in Europe is indivisible. To leave Central Europe outside the Alliance in the so-called "diluted security zone" would encourage activities towards Russia regaining its influence. These would be a destabilising factor throughout the region since any wider conflict whatsoever in Central Europe would also spread to the western part of the continent, bringing the United States in sooner or later. Second, efforts to improve relations with Russia, though plausible to the maximum extent, may not be made at the cost of restricting the justified aspirations of Central European states since that would signify, in effect, a return to the Yalta system and consent to divide Europe according to zones of influence. It would signify acceptance of Russia's false viewpoint that NATO is, indeed, a threat to Russia's security. In reality NATO's expansion is beneficial to Russia since it creates an international environment which can be anticipated and is stable on Russia's western flank, allowing Russia to focus its efforts on resolving internal issues without any detriment to national security. "The New York Times" would surely render Russia a greater service were it to make politicians aware that the greatest danger facing their country is internal instability and a disastrous state of the economy, instead of describing fictitious dangers connected with the expansion of NATO.
B. American-Russian relations
American-Russian relations continue to be important though their nature is transforming. Z.Brzezinski writes on the evolution of the global partnership concept at the turn of the 1980s, through the idea of a strategic partnership, to "partnership without illusions on either side". Russia still wants to play the role of a superpower but such ambitions in a situation of dependence on western economic aid and its own limited possibilities are increasingly often forcing it towards extemporaneous alliances with undemocratic states in continuous conflict with the USA. This is a direction dangerous to the West but disastrous to Russia in the long term. For that reason the most important issue is to support consistently the democratic line of transformations in Russia: support for market reforms, assistance in constructing efficient and democratic national institutions and combating the numerous pathologies. To focus on imperial ambitions does not serve these goals. Contemporary Russia needs a Russian Ataturk more than yet another Catherine the Great.
The key question for the shape of the Alliance's political, military doctrine is - who or what is the Alliance's opponent at present? Democratic Russia, Russia respecting the sovereign rights of other countries, Russia open to co-operation with other countries is definitely not an opponent. But an imperial, expansive Russia could become one, should democratic reforms collapse and the forces of the old order come out on top. This is an improbable but still possible scenario. At the moment the Alliance has no apparent enemy, but dangers exist which the Alliance will have to oppose. These are international terrorism, organised cross-frontier crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, aggressive nationalism and religious fundamentalism. They require an extension of the present mandate with new instruments and methods of reaction, such as conflict-preventing operations and peace-enforcing operations. In this manner the "new" Alliance will be able to react effectively to challenges of the contemporary world and to an increasing degree become a factor of civilisational progress while losing nothing of its present nature and military potential.
C. Kosovo - a gauge of the Alliance's political maturity and credibility
The present military campaign in Yugoslavia is evidence that NATO is taking up fresh tasks as well as a grand test of the Alliance's internal cohesion. To Poland it is a gauge of political maturity and the credibility of our allied obligations. We are a new NATO member and our allied solidarity may not arouse any doubt. We can state that Poland has passed this exam successfully to the moment. Having said that, as a large Central European country, experienced by many wars Poland has the possibility and duty to be more active in the search for ways to resolve that conflict.
The Kosovo conflict has divided public opinion. The bombing of a sovereign country in Central Europe came as a real shock to many of us. The question we ask now is how could this have come about and could nothing really have been done to avoid that tragedy. Doubts may exist whether all the possibilities of diplomatic and political pressure had been exhausted and whether the international community had been sufficiently widely informed of these attempts. There is much ground for the statement that the Rambouillet peace accord was unrealistic: to the Serbs the presence of foreign troops in their country was unacceptable, while the Albanians were not interested in implementing the accord since what they wanted was full independence. Should one simultaneously reject the possibility to change existing borders within Europe, which would have been a dangerous precedence in Poland's case, there was only a tiny opportunity for a peaceful solution to the accord. Perhaps, had NATO spent a greater effort to win Russia over to undertaking a military operation, certain effects may have resulted, but in the present situation NATO has an even smaller room for manoeuvre. To cease the bombing without winning concessions from the Serbs would be a disaster to NATO and also to Poland as a member of the Alliance.
Looking beyond the Kosovo conflict a more general question emerges: what should Poland's role be within the Alliance? Four lines of activity are of very special significance. First, from the very outset readiness should be displayed that Poland is ready to meet its commitments stemming from the Alliance, for such readiness is what we expect from others. That is why no savings should be made on the army, while real integration within NATO military structures should be a national economic priority.
Second, Poland must become engaged in the present discussion on the shape of the Alliance's political, military doctrine, injecting concepts consistent not only with national interests but also consolidating the Atlantic community as a whole. NATO's role and functions in the 21st century have not yet been clearly defined. To maintain the Alliance's strength and cohesion requires its mandate to be extended by fresh tasks, without eliminating the present ones. While recognising the requirement and need for the European countries to be responsible for their own security and, more widely, for stability within Europe, it is absolutely imperative that we strive for a durable and active presence of the United States within Europe.
Third, we must be active in jointly shaping NATO's eastern policy towards the Ukraine and Lithuania as well as Slovakia, Rumania and the remaining Baltic states. The door to NATO must remain open while the prospect of enlarging the Alliance by further countries must be accurately defined.
Finally, Poland bears a special responsibility to impart fresh impetus to relations with Russia, which should be channelled towards close co-operation and strategic partnership. Democratic Russia is needed by Europe just as Europe is needed by Russia.
D. Some conditions for the future
We are approaching the 21st century in which globalism will be accepted as the norm for international phenomena. But what does it signify for a nation?
Nationalism will not be the motive force securing the interests of one's own nation. States will have border lines and not border barriers. That, at least, will be the Europe in the immediate decade. The opening of frontiers and mutual dependence will loosen the values which have been inherent in nationalism.
Nationalism will not vanish. It will continue to constitute a threat to the merging global reality. In such a situation we must accept:
- cultural pluralism
- that the present concept of tolerance must regenerate into acceptance of differences. We fully support John Paul II views on this matter
- models for a democratic system must be based on the acceptance of values which impose globalism. The primacy of human rights over sovereignty is becoming a test of the intentions of 21st century politicians.
To the present, the European Union has proved the best reply to globalisation. Will NATO take the same way? Will it adapt to the new phenomena appearing in the world? Will it bog down in legal standards which do not fit future requirements?
The question: what will take place after the conflict in Yugoslavia will be a test of the world's ability to behave in a new situation. NATO will not lose the Yugoslavian conflict if it enforces respect for the following principles:
a) there may be no imposed border changes in Europe. Should the Balkans open new disputes on European borders, then that will be the end of peace on this continent in the 21st century;
b) human rights exclude ethnic cleansing and the resolving of nationalistic conflicts by force. The necessity will arise of having to live within organisms common to several nations. Tolerance for minorities is insufficient in relation to them. Their acceptance on the grounds of even rights must be the systemic foundation of states or communities.
c) the final moment is approaching when it will be more and more difficult to resolve many conflicts by the use of force.
Effective legal, political and also "policing" institutions must evolve to prevent conflicts.
Poland sees its own interest in the development of such a transformation process within NATO.
E. We shall not be able to perform all obligations rapidly by ourselves
We are a NATO member. That does not solely signify consequences for defence - but also a serious systemic and social challenge.
The government, the elites and also society must learn solidary thinking about one's own interest which also concerns zones beyond Poland's borders.
We are aware that our NATO partners, particularly the USA are awaiting:
- our readiness for military operations in regions where, in NATO's opinion, a danger exists to common security,
- decisions concerning substantial outlays on modernising the Polish army,
- adapting it to the standards which exist in countries of the most advanced
civilisations.
Poland's friends in the USA must take into consideration that Poland has long-standing traditions of battles fought outside its territory, treating it as its own interest.
The important thing today is that Poland's military commitment be understood as commitment to a just cause. This requires that it be clearly defined: who or what is an enemy and why. Where the Polish community is concerned, care should be taken to present the legal, political and moral justification of military operations, to ensure that the Catholic community in Poland possesses moral justification of its own solidarity.
Poland is ready to assume a substantial financial burden on defence in the new geo-political conditions. This must be spread over a period of time due to Poland's still small economic potential.
Poland's NATO partners, particularly the USA must take into account that Poland's arms expenditure should appear in conjunction with the will to uphold Poland's arms industry. Any plans to reduce Poland to just a market for military equipment will aroused social resistance.
Poland's arms industry was constructed not for profit but to maintain sovereignty of defence, an awareness which exists within society to the present day. Senator Biden is wrong when he puts into doubt Poland's ability for strategic solidarity. Poland will be the most loyal and solidary member of NATO. The condition here is to overcome, temporarily, adaptation complexities on our part and also to treat NATO not only as a military organisation but also as a community geared to civilisation transformations.
Poland must receive assistance in performing civilisation changes.
F. To understand well the nature of the situation and one's own duties
An epoch is passing as we watch. This sometimes gives birth to anxiety but also arouses to new searchings. A global human community may not be allowed to become strategically bewildered. The global interdependence of human fate is deepening. The division into supporters and opponents of global joint activity and joint responsibility is losing sense.
The Poles are standing alongside their American allies, convinced of the need for NATO globalisation.
The helplessness displayed by Europe in tackling successive ethnical crises only goes to display just how shallow the concept of a "European defence identity" really is.
Not only Kosovo offers proof of what weight NATO's presence exerts and that the security of the Euro-Atlantic region be placed on it.
For the first time an Alliance of democratic countries has decided to intervene in the name of human rights, filing away the old principle of non-interference and sovereignty of states.
This intervention is a symbol of how deep the evolution of the western legal order and of the hierarchy of values has gone.
The future of Europe is being played out in Kosovo. The evolution of European and world consciousness is facing up to the principle of absolutism and the national state.
A new question has arisen: is the state a despotic sovereign since a recognised higher law stands above it. European liberal humanism should give an unambiguous reply. Such is the message of European civilisation: the intervention in Kosovo is taking place in the defence of persecuted people. And European civilisation sets human rights above national sovereignty. One may pose the question: will Kosovo revolutionise international law.
Kosovo is also a battle of information being fought by a dictatorship against a democracy. It stands on the instability of public opinion which is more influenced by pictures than words of even the most convincing commentary.
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